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In recent years numerous proposals1 have been advanced, some from
surprising sources,2 that would move American society toward greater
economic equality. Although specific bills designed to guarantee a
minimum income have so far failed to pass, practical interest in such
legislation and in protecting citizens against specific deprivations is
probably higher than in any other period. Still, reform efforts have
rarely drawn upon established philosophical tradition to support their
efforts.
This article begins to draw those connections. It will develop and
compare theoretical justifications for state interventions in the market
which would guarantee to every member of society either a minimum
income or minimum satisfaction of "just wants.'" 3 Specifically, it fo-
cuses on two justifications-one derived from traditional utilitarian
theory,4 the other from a theory of rights put forward most recently
and most persuasively by Ronald Dworkin. 5 The utilitarian-based ap-
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo; Fellow in Law & Humanities,
Harvard University.
1. 26 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1030-41 (1970); 25 id. 833-40 (1969).
2. R. NIxoN, WELFARE REFORM-A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 146,
91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) (proposed Family Assistance Plan), reprinted in 115 CONG.
REc. 23143, 23251 (1969).
3. I employ the term "just wants" in the same sense as used in Michelman, Foreword:
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7,
13-14 (1969). Different terms have been used to refer to much the same notion. Musgrave
uses the term "merit wants." R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 13-14 (1959).
Calabresi uses the term "merit goods." Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1100
(1972). James Tobin describes the phenomenon as one of "specific egalitarianism," as
opposed to "general egalitarianism." See Tobin, On Limiting the Domain of Inequality,
13 J. LAW & ECON. 263 (1970).
4. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
(IV. Harrison ed. 1948). Simply viewed, utilitarianism can be described as the theory
that the single criterion by which acts or policies ought to be judged is their con-
tribution to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
5. Dworkin relies heavily on a philosophical tradition growing out of Kant's ethical
writings, which is enriched by use of Wittgenstein's investigations. Dworkin's approach
to rights was presented in lectures at Yale in the fall of 1970. These lectures and his
article, Taking Rights Seriously, in Is LAw DEAD? 168 (E. Rostow ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as Dworkin], are the main sources for the second approach considered in this paper.
Dworkin's analysis of rights and the requirements for state guarantees which follow
from it can be viewed as a justification for Michelman's "minimum protection" ap-
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proach will develop the thesis that total societal utility is systematically
maximized by a distribution of wealth where equality is greater than
it would be if the total wealth of the society,0 not utility, were max-
imized.7 The second approach, based on Dworkin, will develop an
argument for limiting total utility in order to guarantee certain
"rights" (or the claims to have just wants satisfied) to every member
of society. Both approaches justify limiting total wealth in a way
which increases equality.
I
Utilitarianism has long provided the most widely accepted philo-
sophical rationale for policy decisions affecting the allocation of
resources. It is frequently believed that utilitarian principles forbid
any interference with the distribution created by a free market.8 The
question explored in this section is why under utilitarian principles
a group of people should choose an economic solution which provides
for the satisfaction of the basic needs of everyone, or which guarantees
a certain income to each person, even though it has the effect of
proach. While Michelman's work is not primarily an attempt to justify "minimum pro-
tection," he does suggest using a Rawisian justification, see Michelman, supra note 3,
at 14-15, 35. Rawls might conclude that "minimum protection" would be the result of
applying his two principles of justice at the constitutional or legislative stage; Michelman
has given a possible basis for concluding that a Rawlsian legislator would favor ful-
filling "just wants." But cf. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTiCE 275, 277 (1971), where Rawls
suggests that one way to correct for some groups being poor may be to use graded
income supplements (a so-called negative income tax). Michelman's argument at many
points requires a justification for satisfying "just wants" even at the cost of "non-
efficient" or non-Pareto optimal intervention; he fails to offer such a convincing jus-
tification. See Michelman, supra note 3, at 30.
6. In this article wealth is defined as the product of a quantity of goods times
their price, W = QP. Assuming constant prices, wealth increases when the quantity
of valued goods increases.
7. The policy of increasing equality is generally viewed as contrary to the teachings
of utilitarian economics because of the negative effects of market intervention on pro-
duction. Ralph Winter implicitly relies on this view when he concludes that a "good
case can be made . . . that the goals of equalizing income and reducing poverty are
simply inconsistent." Winter, The Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 80.
The notion that interference with the market except to correct for a market failure
will cause a "misallocation" and a decrease in total satisfaction or total societal welfare
is explicitly adhered to by other legal commentators. See, e.g., Bork, Resale Price
Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 950, 954-55 (1968): "If [resale price
maintenance] creates efficiency and so increases society's wealth, there is no more
reason for a legislature to classify it as an undesirable practice . . . than there is to
classify the more efficient rearrangement of machinery as a thing wrong in itself
simply because it produces income." See also Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960). Coase demonstrates that in a "perfect" market situation, an
economically efficient or Pareto optimal result will occur no matter what the original
distribution or entitlements are. The conclusion would seem to follow that any market
intervention other than to correct for "market failures" of certain types would lead to
nonoptimal results and thus cause "misallocation."
8. Winter, supra note 7, at 62.
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lowering the total production of valued goods.9 Or, to give a limited
numerical example, why might a group rationally choose solution B
rather than solution A10 in Table I?
Table I
Persons Possible Wealth Distributions
A B C
X 10 8 4
Y 9 6 4
Z 1 2 4
Total 20 16 12
(the numbers represent quantities of valued goods)
In answering this question we must first enter the utilitarian frame-
work, making a number of assumptions which may be contrary to
reality but which are frequently made by utilitarian economists."
First, it is assumed that there is an inverse relation between total
wealth and equality, as a result of the existence of a dynamic system
or transaction costs. 12 In other words, the distribution system and the
9. The total production of valued goods will be called "wealth" and will be dis-
tinguished from utility. I will assume constant prices; wealth will be increased when
Q2 P > QIP, where Q, represents the total goods before the change, Q2 represents
goods after the change, and P equals price. Realistically, a large change in Q will
cause a change in P. However, for the purposes of this argument I will ignore this
effect. Societal utility will be assumed to be equal to the sum of individual utilities
and to be affected by changes in the distribution of wealth and by changes in total
wealth.
10. The A-type solution represents a distribution where there is no state intervention
and where wealth is maximized.
11. See notes 15, 17, 18 infra.
12. The term "dynamic" means that what is done now has an effect on what is
done later; e.g., removing incentives may affect people's willingness to work, and thus
affect how much is produced. Bentham and Abba Lerner argue that if it were not
for the dynamic or time factor, it could maximize societal utilities to have complete
equality. J. BENTHAm, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 133-41 (1914); A. LERNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF CONTROL 23-40 (1944). Transaction costs are relevant because if re-
sources are used in the process of increasing equality (collecting taxes and operating
a welfare system both cost money), then increasing equality would result in a de-
creased total of individual wealth (sum of economic goods), since the efforts and re-
sources used in the process do not result in the production of "economic goods"
which anyone could possess or use. The only author of whom I am aware who re-
jects the Lerner argument for the static case is R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
LAW 216-18 (1972). He claims that there is "no theoretical basis" for concluding "that
a transfer of money from a wealthy man to a poor one is likely to increase the sum
of the two men's total utilities." Id. at 216. Granted, without knowing people's utility
curves and being able to compare them, the theoretical conclusion can only be that
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production system are interrelated, so that interference with one af-
fects the other.13 An unequal distribution will result in the greatest
production of valued goods, because wealth and equality are related
inversely.14 Such a claim is often made by supporters of a free market
an increase of utility from increasing equality is "likely" (rejected by Posner) or would
increase "probable total satisfaction" (Lerner). This conclusion, however, does follow
unless it is assumed that utility curves of the rich are higher than those of the poor
and would remain so even as the poor became better off. See A. LERNER, supra, at 35-36.
As Lerner points out, if the "experience of higher income had the effect of raising
the curve of marginal utility of income," this fact would only relate to how fast the
transition to greater equality should occur. Id. at 35. Thus, in order to say that the
distribution should be unequal because the rich have higher utility curves, one must
say that those who become rich are inherently better able to derive utility from
money, a belief Lerner labels racist, id. at 35. At a minimum, it has little basis in
reason or observation.
13. Neoclassical economists and legal commentators generally accept the inverse re-
lation between state nonmarket promotion of equality and societal production of wealth.
See notes 6, 7 supra. However, from some perspectives this inverse relation may not be
true or relevant. For example, from a Marxist perspective, 1) the bourgeois definition
of wealth used in this article would be rejected; 2) a goal of maximum production of
bourgeois wealth would be questioned; 3) the emphasis on equality of distribution
rather than on forms of production would be criticized. Marx explains: "The wealth
of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself
as an immense accumulation of commodities." 1 K. MARX, CAPITAL 35 (F. Engels ed. 1967).
"For real wealth is the developed productive force of all individuals. It is no longer
the labour time but the disposable time which is the measure of wealth." K. MARx,
THE GRUNDRISSE 145 (D. McLellan ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as GRUNDRISSE]. The
"highest development of productive forces" corresponds to the "richest development of
the individual." Id. at 120. Marx argues that the whole evaluation process of bour-
geois economics fails to make sense, because bourgeois economics takes man and his
wants and orientations for granted while Marx argues that man is central to any
notion of wealth; that wealth increases as man develops. "To economize on labour
time means to increase the amount of free time, i.e, time for the complete development
of the individual, which again reacts as the greatest productive force on the productive
force of labour . . . . Free time . . . transforms anyone who enjoys it into a different
person, and it is this different person who enters the direct process of production."
Id. at 148.
Marx rejects the commodity notion of wealth; he argues as well that emphasis on
equalizing distribution should not be a primary goal, but rather that emphasis must
be on the mode of production out of which come differing organizations of distribution.
"An enforced raising of wages . . . would therefore be nothing but a better slave-salary
and would not achieve either for the worker or for labor human significance and
dignity." ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS 1844: WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX
ON PHILOSOPHY AND SocIEvY 298 (L. Easton & K. Guddat eds. 1967) (emphasis added).
"A definite form of production thus determines the forms of consumption, distribution,
exchange and also the mutual relations between these various elements." GRUNDRISSE,
supra, at 33. See also id. at 152; K. MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM 3 (C. Dutt
ed. 1938). In this article, I will not adopt this Marxist perspective but will limit myself
to exploring the implications of the presently dominant form of economic analysis,
derived from utilitarianism.
14. Traditional theory says that an optimal production of valued goods (including
leisure) occurs when there is no market interference except to correct for market
imperfections. If one assumes this to be the case, wealth and equality would be di-
rectly related when the intervention is to decrease the amount of equality resulting
from market transactions and inversely related when the intervention is to increase
equality. Also, most would agree that the negative effect of intervention would in-
crease as the amount of intervention increased (at least up to some point). Since the
only concern here is with the part of the trade-off curve from the point of maximum
production and no intervention to the point of lesser production and intervention to
increase equality, we can conclude 1) that wealth production and equality will be
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system, 5 and this assumption is accepted for the purposes of this article.
A second important assumption, which applies to the evaluation
of individual utilities, is that a person derives utility only from his
inversely related over this range, and 2) that the trade-off function is a smooth curve,
and that the slope of the trade-off curve at the point of no intervention is zero.
dW




Even if some authoritarian intervention which decreased equality could be shown to
increase production (only explained by traditional theory in terms of failing to value
leisure and other "nonmarket" goods or of correcting market failures), there will
always come a point where this increase in production could not occur. On the other
hand, increases of income to the poor may in some circumstances amount to a rela-
tively high. yield investment in a product factor. See 3 G. MYRDAL, AsIAN DRAMA
1912-18 (1968).
15. Inequality, it is claimed, serves an important function because an incentive
system is necessary to induce productive efforts, or, more generally, proper factor
payments result in the most productive employment of resources, even though this
results in inequality. Assuming an ideal market model, any intervention by the state
would cause a "misallocation" of resources, and consequently a smaller production of
valued goods. Only intervention to handle market failures (which were excluded from
the ideal model) does not decrease total wealth. Unless people's utility functions are
interdependent so that wealth distributions create a public goods problem or unless
there is market failure, then, a state guarantee of a minimum level of individual in-
come is the type of intervention which causes a "misallocation" or a non-Pareto op-
timum result. (A Pareto optimum exists when no trade or change could be made
which would make someone better off without leaving someone else worse off. An
efficiency or Pareto justification for a change may exist if the gainers could pay off
the losers from their gains, even if the pay-off does not actually occur.) But cf. Calabresi,
Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAw
& EcoN. 67 (1968). Calabresi argues that in certain situations the choice between in-
tervention or nonintervention, or between different types of intervention, will not,
given our knowledge, be determinable by reference to the concept of maximizing total
wealth. In such situations one should choose the solution which maximizes other
values which one might hold, e.g., equality.
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own wealth. In other words, his utility is independent of any other
individual's happiness or well-being. "Goods" are assumed to have
a value for a person only to the extent that the "goods" have a direct
effect on him, and any effect on others is irrelevant or nonexistent.
Thus, only the "utils"''1 that a person receives from his portion of
total wealth will be considered, not utils which may be derived from
sources which relate to relations with other people. 17
16. "Utils" are units of whatever is being maximized by utilitarian theory, gen-
erally happiness, pleasure (the opposite of pain), or satisfaction.
17. It might well be argued that interdependence is a more realistic assumption.
Dropping the assumption of independence of utility functions would indeed be a more
direct way to strengthen the argument for increasing equality. See, e.g., Hochman &
Rogers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 AM. EcoN. REv. 542-57 (1969). The argument
from interdependence is frequently misunderstood and creates measurement and con-
ceptual difficulties. For example, while juggling the concepts of cost and value, Winter
argues that the costs of an in-kind redistribution are always greater than the value
received by the poor as the poor perceive it. Winter, supra note 7, at 74. Even assuming
interdependence of utility functions, given declining marginal utility of wealth, this
statement is no basis for saying that utility would not be increased by such distributions.
When interdependence is assumed, the rich might benefit from providing the poor with
certain specific goods; and, although they may not benefit enough to want to pay for
the benefits, cf. id. at 77, the increased utility to the rich from the poor receiving
these specific benefits plus an increased utility to the poor may be greater than the
loss of utility to the rich due to the cost of providing the benefits plus the loss to
the poor due to having the specific goods rather than money. Thus, contrary to
Winter's conclusion, id., assuming interdependence suggests a utility analysis conclusion
that in-kind redistribution not only increases total satisfaction but does so to a greater
degree than monetary redistribution. By assuming independence, this article derives
utilitarian arguments for action which increases equality that may be on firmer ground
than those based on interdependence. The plausibility of declining marginal utility
is better established than the specific forms of interdependence needed by the Hockman-
Rogers argument, supra.
It may be more significant at this stage to trace out the implications of the as-
sumption of independence of utility functions. Most generally, the assumption allows
value to be given only to relations between a person and an object or service and
not to relations between people-it is subject-object, not subject-subject, oriented. See
generally R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 162-99 (1968). This means: 1) States
or conditions such as equality are not given a value; 2) the effect the production
system has on the relationships between people is not given a value; 3) the effect that
the distribution system has on the relationships between people is not given a value.
The fundamental noncommodity nonobject nature of these values makes them unsuit-
able for market handling. These failures of the market lead to two different criticisms.
First, to the extent that a market fails, when making allocations, to consider certain
values, we have no reason to expect that it makes "efficient" or desirable allocations.
The market fails as a value-free and as an efficient allocator of goods. Second, to the
extent that the existence of the market affects interpersonal values, its existence may
itself be a (negatively or positively valued) "good" which itself cannot be valued cor-
rectly by market processes. Tribe, in an excellent analysis of systematic distortions in-
volved in the policy sciences, shows that "procedures that shape individual and social
activity have significance independent of the final products they generate." Tribe,
Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 66-79 (1972). He argues
that the "processes and rules that constitute the enterprise and define the roles of
the participants matter quite apart from any identifiable 'end state' that is ultimately
produced. Indeed, in many cases it is the process itself that matters most." Id. at 83.
The assumption that utility functions are independent, if deeply believed, becomes
a theory about the nature of man. It is perhaps at this level that the most cogent
arguments are made against the assumption and its consequences. On the notion that
market relations cause alienation between man and man, see ECONOsnC AND PHILOSOPHIC
MANUSCRIPTS (1844): WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX, supra note 13, at 295-96, 307-08;
H. MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUrON 279 (1941). Although his evaluation may differ,
Weber makes similar observations. He states: "'Where the market is allowed to follow
its own autonomous tendencies, its participants do not look toward the persons of
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If a utilitarian believed that each unit of wealth an individual re-
ceived was of equal value to the individual-that is, had the same
utility-he would have to conclude that only an A-type solution (re-
ferring to Table I) would be the utility-maximizing choice. However,
it is more reasonable to adopt a third assumption: that people have
a declining marginal utility for wealth.'8 People place a higher value
on their first dollar than their second, on their second dollar than on
their third. A poor man would thus value an extra dollar more than
would a rich man, while everyone would value the first dollars of his
income more highly. Given this third assumption, a partial redistri-
bution of income would maximize the total of individual utilities,
even though (according to our first assumption) total societal wealth
would be somewhat reduced as a result.
An example will clarify this conclusion. Theoretically, if we knew
the typical individual utility function for wealth'9 and the amount
each other but only toward the commodity." "[T]he market is fundamentally alien
to any type of fraternal relationship." "The private enterprise system transforms into
objects of 'labor market transactions' even those personal and authoritarian-hierarchical
relations which actually exist in the capitalistic enterprise." M. WEBER, ON LAw IN
ECONOMY AND SocIETY 190-93 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1925). See Parsons, Introduction, in
M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 33 (f. Parsons ed.
1947). Full treatment of these arguments is beyond the scope of this article.
18. A declining marginal utility for wealth implies that for any given individual
each additional unit of wealth increases utility by a decreasing magnitude; or that
dU >0 d2U <0O
dW > d; V2 <0
19. I use "typical" to mean "average." Average might imply that each function is
known and that an average of all functions can be obtained by addition and division.
However, to know every individual function we presumably would have to know
with which individual it was connected. In order to maximize utility, society would
have to distribute the total depending on whether a particular person had a sharply
or slowly declining utility function. The problems with this include: the absence of
reliable techniques for making interpersonal or cardinal intrapersonal comparisons;
the costs of administering such a system, which would cause greater utility losses
than the resulting utility gains; and the possible ethical complaints about making
distributions on such a basis. Calculations based on an average or typical utility
function lead to a suggested distribution which might not produce the highest pos-
sible total utility, but should lead to a higher total utility than can be expected from
the use of any other basis of calculation. Deviations from any maximums will be
statistically likely to be smaller than if any other function is used, assuming either
that one does not know or finds unusable each individual's utility function. See A.
LERNER, supra note 12, at 28-32.
The use of a "typical" utility function, which would be the basis for the claim made
in the text that the poor person receives greater utility than the rich person from the
extra dollar, might appear to involve an unjustified interpersonal comparison of utility.
The problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility is a label used primarily to
describe two separate issues: whether utility of different people is by nature com-
parable; whether specific comparisons can be made. To assume, as we do here, that
a typical utility function can be used for different people and that the addition of
the results gives accurate information about probable utility effects, involves only the
assumption that the utility of different people is similar, in the sense that it is the
same kind of thing, but that comparisons of individual differences in capacities to
derive utility from wealth cannot (or will not) be made. The use of a typical utility
function for different individuals and the addition of the results does not involve in-
terpersonal comparisons in the second sense-and it is in the second sense that the
validity of interpersonal comparisons is normally challenged.
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total wealth would change with an increase in equality,20 then we
could determine the exact degree of equality which would maximize
total societal utility. For illustrative purposes, I will use a two-person
model, and will choose equations which are arbitrary2' except for
the fact that they correspond to the two critical assumptions mentioned
above, namely, that wealth and equality vary inversely, and that every
individual has a diminishing marginal utility for wealth.
100
The equation W - is consistent with the assumption
4E2 + 1
that wealth and equality are inversely related. In addition it represents
a smooth function of the relation between E and W, such that the first
increase of E results in the smallest corresponding change in W.
22
(W = total wealth in the society; E = equality, expressed in this two-
a+b- a-b I 2b
person model as E = , or, if a b, Ea~b a+b
where "a" represents the wealth of A, and "b" represents the wealth
of B. E varies from 1 when A and B have equal wealth, to 0, when
either A or B has all the wealth and the other has nothing.)23 Next,
assume u = V/w, where "u" represents individual utility and "w"
represents individual wealth. This equation represents our rational
assumption that individuals have a declining marginal utility for
wealth. Total societal utility is the sum of individual utilities: U =
- -+ \/b where U represents total society utility. Utility (U)
can now be expressed as a function of equality (E), and the amount
of equality necessary to maximize total societal utility can be deter-
mined by simple calculus.2 4 Under the formula selected for this il-
20. The knowledge needed is how great a misallocation would result from an in-
tervention to obtain a given increase in equality.
21. The equations are not intended to express actual conditions in the world, but
the form of the curves represented fits the criteria of our assumptions. It can be
shown algebraically that any equations satisfying the assumptions of diminishing mar-
ginal utility and an inverse relationship between total wealth and equality will yield
the type of results produced in the text.
22. See note 14 supra & note 25 infra.
23. Wealth is expected to be greatest when E = K, K being the level of equality
produced by a perfect market. However, the equations reflect the correct shape of
the functions if they represent the interval between no intervention and intervention
which results in complete equality (E = 1). This is the only interval with which we
are concerned. See note 14 supra.
24. The above equations can be used to show that U = 10 (V!!-E + VE).
dU 8E2 + 2By finding d , setting it equal to 0, and evaluating the second derivative, it is easydE7-
to find the value of E where U is maximized. In this case, the maximum value of
U is 11.836 which is attained when E = .146. Substitution of this value for E into
the equation for wealth yields the result that W = 92.1435, as contrasted with a value
of W equal to 100 when E = 0.
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lustration, utility is maximized when E = .146, W = 92.1435, and
U = 11.836. According to the categories in Table I, this is a B-type
solution, because utility is maximized under conditions of less than
maximum wealth and less than maximum equality. It should be noted,
moreover, that implementing a B-type solution means, in effect, es-
tablishing a minimum income. Given the assumptions of an inverse
relationship between equality and wealth and a declining marginal
utility of wealth, maximizing utility will always produce a B-type
solution, regardless of the exact mathematical formulation of the func-
tional relationship between equality, wealth, and utility.25 Conse-
25. Equations relating wealth, utility, and equality can be written which fulfill the
following conditions: I) declining marginal utility of wealth; 2) decreases in wealth
resulting from interventions. These equations show utility: a) maximized when E = K
[K is the value of E when there are no interventions and W is maximized]; b) maxi-
mized when E = I [E = 1 when there is perfect equality]; c) remaining constant when
1 > E > K; d) maximized when 1 > E > K. From these two conditions alone, inter-
vention could increase, decrease, or not affect utility. If utility is maximized when
1 > E > K then some redistribution would be justified if society were trying to
maximize the sum of individual utilities-e.g., utility would be maximized when E > K
and K is the amount of equality before market intervention. The cases where utility is
maximized when E = K or remains constant when 1 > E K are rejected because
of a third assumption about the shape of the wealth-equality function at and near the
point where there is no intervention. At the point of no intervention, dW = 0 and
dE
the rate at which intervention disrupts the system of production and causes a de-
crease in wealth will increase as the amount of intervention increases. On this basis,
I will assume a smooth curve for W = f(E), with the slope equaling 0 when W is
maximized at E = K; that is, f'(K) = 0. Since total utility would increase as equality
increases if it were not for the decreases in W, there will be values of E where W
is decreasing but not decreasing at a rate sufficient to nullify the increase of U caused
by the redistribution (the increase in E). These values of E will be when E > K. It
should be noted that the amount a given transfer can be expected to increase utility,
holding wealth constant, will vary inversely with equality-that is, the largest gains
will be from the first transfers. (This fact, not relied upon below, strengthens the
argument for some intervention.)
When U increases more with a given change of E than it decreases with the cor-
responding change in W, U is increasing. Assume dW to the derivative of W =
dE
f(E) and B and - are partial derivatives of U = F (E, W). Since the di-
rectional derivative of U along the curve of intersection of W = f(E) and U = F(E, W)
(curve C), is given by
DeU aU 5U dWDoU _ + _'W_ dE
dW
using E as the curve parameter, E increasing, and since dE = 0 when E = K,
then DU = 5U at the point on curve C, P., where E = K.
Since a- > 0 when K < E < I (because of the assumption of declining marginal
utility of wealth) then DU > 0 at P.. Hence U is increasing at that point. Therefore,
U will have a value larger than its value at P. at points on C in the direction of
increasing E. Therefore, to maximize utility, given the assumptions above, we would
have to increase equality to a point beyond that established by the perfect market.
(I am indebted to Professor Budmon R. Davis who helped me with the mathematics
of this article.)
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quently, at least a limited intervention to increase equality will al-
ways be justified under utilitarian principles.2 6
II
The foregoing reveals that setting a guaranteed minimum for in-
dividual income may be utilitarian even though it causes a reduction
in total societal wealth. Beyond this, we need to know if there are
situations in which we can justify social choices which would reduce
the sum of individual utilities. To explore this question, we need to
expand our horizons beyond the utilitarian view developed above,
and we will do so by making use of a theory which Ronald Dworkin
presented in lectures at Yale during the fall of 1970.27 We continue
to accept the three assumptions made earlier.
Dworkin argues for the existence of rights. A right, in the sense
Dworkin uses it, is a claim which the government would be wrong
to override if the government's only grounds were that overriding
the right would increase the well-being of the community as a whole.28
Thus, a right is a claim to have a certain need satisfied even if having
this need satisfied causes a decrease in total or average utility. Rights
are valid claims by individuals which limit the state's authority to
apply strict utilitarian principles in its legislation and law. Dworkin
therefore argues for minimum need satisfaction (i.e., recognition and
fulfillment of rights) rather than a minimum income guarantee. 20
Rights could be provided for by in-kind provision of needed goods
or services, or by distributions of money based on an administrative
determination of the amount required to satisfy just wants.
Dworkin argues that equal treatment under the law, freedom of
speech, and, in some circumstances, the right to be left alone, are
rights. 30 He also claims that his theory establishes a basis from which
to argue that people have a right to have many of the goods which are
supplied by the modern welfare state, such as education, fire protec-
tion, food, or medical care. The practical effect of satisfying just wants
would be to increase the degree of economic equality, since the state
26. This is assuming perfect markets and no transaction costs. It is of course con-
ceivable that administration costs of the intervention will cause a net loss of utility.
27. See note 5 supra.
28. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 176-78.
29. Cf. Michelman, supra note 3, at 9, 12-14. The words, "rights" and "just wants,"
can be seen as different labels for the same thing. If rights exist, they would perform
the role of just wants in a minimum protection theory, such as that suggested by
Michelman. I generally use the language of rights, rather than just wants, because
by focusing on rights, the justification is clearer and identification is easier.
30. See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 176-77.
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would be providing needed goods and services to those who could
not otherwise afford them.
Dworkin's argument does not require that just wants invariably be
satisfied.3 ' However, it does require that any abridgement of rights
not be based solely on the utilitarian promotion of the general wel-
fare.32 For example, a right could be limited or abridged if it con-
flicted with a competing right, but not because the cost of upholding
the right was greater than the utilitarian benefit.33
What justification is there for recognizing the existence of rights
as described above? From a utilitarian point of view, it may be neces-
sary to leave some people in a condition where all their just wants are
not satisfied. If we are to accept the theory of rights, then we must
have some basis for rejecting the exclusive governance of utility. We
may begin to establish this basis by considering the difference between
being obliged and being obligated,34 for the practices constituting the
realm of law in a society, or at least in Western liberal democratic
societies, cannot be understood without the concept of obligation.
Stated briefly, being obliged has the connotation of being forced.
For a person to be obliged, he must believe that his action was neces-
31. The use of "just want" as applied for education or food, for example, implies
not only a "type" content but also a certain level of fulfillment. Education or caloric
intake up to a certain quantitative and qualitative level may be considered a just
want. Above those levels education or food may still be desired but it may no longer
be a just want-the person may no longer have a right to demand a fulfillment of
the desire, although he probably would have the freedom to purchase the goods
necessary to match the desire. The term "just want," as used in this paper, refers
to a right to goods fulfilling the want up to a certain justified level, not to any
level the individual might desire.
32. Of course one might justify the protection of rights on the grounds that in
the long run general welfare will be advanced by doing so. Dworkin admits that
this sort of "institutional" utilitarianism is consistent with his theory. Dworkin, supra
note 5, at 186 n.l. See note 45 infra.
33. See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 188-92. In lectures at Yale, Dworkin argued that
a version of utilitarianism may be an appropriate basis for legislation. He explained
that utilitarianism derives from a larger moral construct which also justifies, in fact
requires, limitations on the advancement of utility in certain circumstances. Con-
sequently, the same framework may justify both utilitarianism and recognition of
nonutilitarian rights.
34. Hart makes this distinction and it plays an important role in his theory of
law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 79-88 (1961). However, Hart does not
adequately explain why a person ought to be obligated. He shows that Western legal
practices require the existence of obligation but does not say what practices are re-
quired if obligation is to exist. A person is legally obligated, according to Hart, when
his case falls under a rule identified by the fundamental rule of recognition which
is not "valid" like other rules, but which is accepted. What Hart does not adequately
do, and what Dworkin tries to do, is to explain how practices justify obligation-why
a person ought to accept being obligated. In part, Hart fails to do this because his
distinction between the internal and external aspect of rules suggests a normative ac-
ceptance of the sociologically viewed rule. See Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory,
81 YALE L.J. 855, 857-68 (1972). Dworkin argues that only existing social practices
constitute the groundwork for the argument for particular rules-or for obligation. It
is this argument which explains obligation and the rationale for rights.
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sary because of harm that would befall him if he did not so act. To
be obligated means that one's case falls under a rule which for some
reason one ought to obey,35 or that the case for being obligated in
the particular situation is stronger than the case against it.a6 H. L. A.
Hart has argued that rules impose obligations "when the general de-
mand for conformity is insistent and the social pressure brought to
bear on those who deviate or threaten to deviate is great."'3 For a
system of law to be efficacious, general acceptance of the obligatory
nature of law may be necessary. Dworkin goes on to point out, how-
ever, that for a person to be obligated it is not necessary that he
"feel" obligated or "feel" pressure or that he accept the obligation.
No psychological factors are necessary, although they may commonly
coexist with obligation. What is necessary is that good arguments
can be made why a person ought to be obligated, why he ought to
accept the duty or obey the law.
3 8
Dworkin argues that Western social practices cannot be understood
solely in terms of people's being obliged. Accurate understanding of
such practices requires us to use the concept of obligation.3 9 To dem-
onstrate this point, we shall explore two theories of society-the first
based only on being obliged, the second involving obligation. The
fit of the second with our practices amounts to an argument for the
recognition of rights.
The first theory, which at various points resembles the model of
Hobbes and of Locke,40 justifies the existence of a state (or sovereign)
and of law as a response to the state of nature or the state of war,
where no one is secure and everyone is free to use his power to take
anything from anyone. 4 1 In this situation, everyone would find it
preferable to surrender his individual power to a sovereign who es-
tablishes order. The sovereign makes rules which are backed up by
35. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 34, at 83-88; cf. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35
U. Cm. L. REv. 14, 17 (1967).
36. Dworkin, supra note 35, at 45.
37. H.L.A. HART, supra note 34, at 84.
38. Hart and Dworkin part company at this point. Hart's solution-that a person
is legally obligated when a rule of recognition is generally accepted and when the
person's case falls under a rule which is valid because identified by the rule of recog-
nition-is criticized by Dworkin.
39. See Dworkin, supra note 34, at 877-78.
40. T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN (M. Oakeshott ed. 1946); J. LocE, Two TREATSES OF
GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1965).
41. Whether the theorist thinks the concept of justice is applicable in the state
of nature, or whether he thinks that in the state of nature a person ought to take
only what he can use, is irrelevant for our purposes. Given that some want more than
they have, and given no restraining influence, each person's desire for security, which
is never achieved, requires that each person strive for more and more. Thus, the war
of all against all results.
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his power, and people are obliged to obey, thus ensuring order, which
is generally beneficial. Within this corporate framework, the only
guide for the rule of the sovereign is the general good or the general
welfare. Everyone is thought to be better off to the extent the cor-
porate whole is better off, and the sovereign is the corporate manage-
ment. Although this hypothetical may convince a person to give power
over to the state so that order might be maintained, why would he
be obligated, as opposed to obliged, to obey the law? Whenever he
thinks his interests are better served by disobedience rather than obe-
dience-because he thinks he will not be caught or because the pun-
ishment he will receive does not outweigh the advantage gained from
disobedience-he has no reason to follow the rule. Thus, obligation
is not established.
The second theory of society draws upon the thought of Rousseau
and Kant. Dworkin argues that in this conception of society, a person
must be asked, not told, to obey. Obligation can only be justified
to the extent that an autonomous, free and equal person could ra-
tionally be expected to accept the request. A person can be forced to
be obliged, but must consent to be obligated.
The request is made to him as a member of the political com-
munity. This concept of membership is in fact the grounding of ob-
ligation. Dworkin, following Rousseau, sees that obligation can exist
among members of a community; it could not exist among units of
a conglomerate. 42 In the corporate model, maximizing was the only
rational policy from the sovereign's or the subject's viewpoint. In
the community or cooperative model, the state is required to give a
justification for expecting each member to accept the rules of the
community.
What is implied in asking a person to be a member of a community
and to be obligated by its law? First, the potential member must be
respected as a person, or else the request is more an order than an
invitation. The request must be made to the person as an intelligent
human being who is concerned with his humanity and is to some
extent self-interested. To be obligated means that a person may be
justifiably expected to obey even if disobedience would be to his in-
dividual advantage. To ask him thus to act to benefit others without
regard for himself, he must be shown that others are asked to do the
same. If not, the person in effect is asked to be a slave, not a member.
42. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SoCIAL CONTAar, at 175, 178-80 (E. Barker
ed. 1962).
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As a prerequisite to asking him to accept obligation, then, he must
be accorded respect as an autonomous person, equal to the respect
he is asked to give others. Moreover, if the practices of the society
indicate that certain things are necessary in order to be a full member,
then the community must assure the provision of these things to all
who are expected to be a part of the community. Anything less would
not be a convincing basis from which to argue that he ought to join,
that he ought to accept the request to be obligated.43 Or to put it in
different terms, it would be an insult 44 for a person to have to do
without those things.
Simply stated, the justification for a person's being obligated re-
quires the recognition of rights. We can ask a person to be obligated
only if the legal order accords him respect as a free and equal person.
For obligation to exist, rights must be granted.45 The content of the
43. In his article-Dworkin, supra note 5-Dworkin's approach was somewhat dif-
ferent than in his lectures. The elements are basically the same, however, although he
arranged them differently. In the article, before tying the concept of rights to the
discussion in the text above, he first shows that legal rights are only significant if
they are rights against utility. He then demonstrates the existence of certain practices
which indicate the existence of legal rights of this type. He writes:
Anyone who professes to take rights seriously . . . must accept, at the minimum,
one or both of two important ideas. The first is the vague but powerful idea
of human dignity. This idea, associated with Kant, but defended by philosophers
of different schools, supposes that there are ways of treating a man that are in-
consistent with recognizing him as a full member of the human community ...
The second is the more familiar idea of political equality.
Id. at 176, 186-87.
44. The use of the term "insult" here is not dependent on a particular person's
feeling insulted. If, given the practices of that society, it would be degrading or dis-
respectful to a person's integrity or humanity to have to do without some goods or
privileges, that is all that is required. It is not necessary for a person actually to feel
insulted in order for him to have a right. On the other hand, if nobody in a society
feels insulted when forced to do without certain goods, that fact would be strong
evidence that the practices of that society do not justify the argument that those
goods are within the ambit of rights or just wants. It might, however, be argued
that a people's sensibilities were dulled, and therefore that certain unfelt deprivations
might be deprivation of "rights."
45. Of course, one might try to argue that Dworkin is really a long-run utilitarian,
i.e., that protection of rights is justified because in the long run such protection
maximizes utility at the lowest cost. Dworkin argues that the scope of utilitarian
governance be limited given the need to establish a basis for law, a basis which
presupposes obligation and community. Law is necessary for the production of valued
goods. To the ettent that this reasoning is convincing, then perhaps utility itself requires
limitations justified by rights even though rights limit immediate wealth maximi-
zation by the society. In other words, the costs of forcing people to be obliged (the
only way to establish order if the system is unable to create a sense of obligation) may
be higher than the expense involved in guaranteeing rights. Hence, guaranteeing
rights would maximize utility; the rights approach would be utilitarian. Dworkin
recognized this possibility, if one employs this peculiar form of institutional utilitarianism:
[One] may believe . . . that the general good will be advanced, in the long run,
only if we treat indignity or inequality as very great injustices, and never allow
our opinions about the general good to justify them. I do not know of any good
arguments for or against this sort of "institutional" utilitarianism, but it is con-
sistent with my point, because it argues that we must treat violations of dignity
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rights depends on what is essential to being a fully respected, free
and equal person in that community. 46
There will always be arguments, based on a given culture's social
practices, about when a person should be obligated and when he has
a right which laws should not abridge. For example, one can justifiably
ask a person to feel obligated by a law with which he disagrees by
pointing out that a community cannot always reach unanimous agree-
ment, and that the community cannot survive unless people respect
the results of the decisionmaking process even when they dislike cer-
tain results. He is asked to respect a community of which he is a
full member. On the other hand, to tell a particular person that he
and equality as special moral crimes, beyond the reach of ordinary utilitarian
justification.
Dworkin, supra note 5, at 186 n.l.
However, this form of utilitarianism departs strikingly from ordinary utilitarian
justifications. Moreover, its foundation for rights is more tenuous than Dworkin's, be-
cause it depends on the contingent evaluation of long-term factors-on learning how
obligated people feel when granted certain rights and how expensive obliging people
to obey commands would be.
This long-run perspective also characterizes rule utilitarianism. As generally used,
"rule utilitarianism" refers to positions which argue that utility is best maximized not
by applying utilitarian analysis to the specific act in question but by following a rule
of general application. These arguments are usually founded either on the existence
of costs or difficulties in applying utility analysis to specific cases or on the utilitarian
advantage of maintaining certain general practices. For a good philosophical treatment,
see D. LYONs, FoRss AND LIMirs OF UTILITARIANISM (1965) (especially at pp. VII-XI, 11,
119-60).
46. We may use Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as a suggestive illustration.
The majority in Miranda was concerned that legal rules not infringe upon rights which
were basic to being a fully respected, free and equal member of the community. For
example, the Court discusses how the interrogation atmosphere can be "destructive of
human dignity." Id. at 457. And, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privi-
lege is the respect a government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and in-
tegrity of its citizens." Id. at 460. The Court's concern for respecting the individual
as a full member of the community-as a citizen-led it to reject "all interrogation
practices which are likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him
from making a free and rational choice." Id. at 464-65. The Miranda Court's usage of
rights implies that the government must act in a way that respects the individual's
full and equal membership in the community, that it must act in a way consistent
with his dignity. The focus of the decision is therefore on the government's practices.
This interpretation helps explain Miranda's requirement that warning be given ir-
respective of the detainee's age, education, intelligence, or his prior contact with au-
thorities. Particularized need is irrelevant; all individuals are entitled to this treatment.
Likewise, the question of knowing and intelligent waiver does not depend on the
detainee's actual knowledge or the intelligence of the waiver of the individual's rights,
but on the police using proper procedures, including procedures responsive to any
observable indication of lack of voluntariness or knowledge. Id. at 479.
Justice Harlan in dissent, joined by Justices White and Stewart, takes a different
theoretical position. He employs utilitarian analysis to see if the practices are "worth
the price paid for [them]." Id. at 516. Justice Harlan strongly condemns the majority
for "passing over the costs and risks of its experiment." Id. at 517. However, not able
or willing to make the required utilitarian calculations himself, he leaves them to the
legislature. Id. at 524.
The majority, we may say, thus looked at what is required by a system of rights
which respects a person's full and equal membership in the community, while the
dissent feared the utilitarian consequences. The majority wrote from a Kantian per-
spective; the dissent adopted a Benthamite perspective.
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cannot speak out about matters that concern him deprives him of
the preconditions for being human (as defined by our social practices)
and thus shows a lack of respect for his full membership in the com-
munity.47 It would be telling him that his views about policy do
not count like other views, that he is not a full member since he
must give up more than others for the sake of the general good.48
This is more than asking him to follow a group decision which he
does not like-it is asking him to deny his own integrity.49 The theory
of obligation thus justifies the recognition of a "right" of free speech.
The content of all rights depends on the social practices of the
specific community. In a society where education is generally avail-
able, where it is seen to be necessary for self-fulfillment and for
successful economic activity, and where participants in the society's
political and social culture are expected to be educated, the social
practices in that society imply a right to education. In another com-
munity which believes that the ability to read the word of God is
necessary for salvation and that salvation is the goal of human life,
an individual could make a similar but more limited claim: that he
has a right to be taught to read even if maximization of societal utility
would not require it. Likewise, if a person was not considered re-
spectable without possessing certain clothing, then access to clothing
might be considered a right. It is not inconceivable that two dif-
ferent societies might establish drastically different sets of rights at-
taching to their respective members, for the specific content of rights
depends on the actual social practices of the society, not on some un-
changing transcendental conception of natural rights. It may nonethe-
less be the case that we find some particular rights, or the existence
47. See Rousseau, supra note 42, at 191 n.1.
48. To require everyone not to speak or publicize opinions about a certain issue
or policy is more complex. There are several approaches to such a prescription. In a
way such a requirement shows disrespect for everybody. Or it might be said that
Western practices require that those who are affected by rules or law must be al-
lowed to participate in their formulation. Both of these arguments lead to a con-
clusion that everyone is suffering a loss of rights.
49. There might be a difference between requiring a person to do what he is con-
scientiously opposed to doing and prohibiting him from doing what he thinks should
be permissible, or is in his self-interest to do. Several Supreme Court cases in the
area of free exercise of religion suggest this distinction. Compare McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (prohibiting someone from working on Sunday is constitu-
tional), with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (requiring someone to work on
Saturday is unconstitutional). It may also be a greater affront to a person's integrity
to require him to act contrary to his values than to deny him the right to violate
laws based on his judgments about the efficacy of underlying policies. If so, more
deference ought to be given the draft resister who believes that war is unethical, than
the doctor who believes socialized medicine is foolish. But these considerations are
distinct from questions of rights. Rights do not depend on the actor's motives, but on
arguments based on social practices. See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 191.
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of rights in general, required by social practices or forms of human
interaction which are so basic a part of man's natural history, man's
historically developed forms of life, that a society which did not have
these practices would be unintelligible to us. ° If these deeply em-
bedded practices justify individual rights, people would have a basis
for objecting to any denial of these rights by existing institutions,
but the grounds for criticism would not come from outside the human
world, but would depend on actual practices of the society.A'
If law only obliged people, the argument for rights would fail. But
such a conception of law does not explain our social practices. In-
stead, modem social practices imply "obligation," which depends on
the possibility of justifying to each member of the community the
request that he obey the law. Obligation requires respect for the
principles of community and individual integrity. The existence of
obligation means rights must be recognized. Dworkin has provided
an argument for the existence of rights in general and has shown how
arguments for specific rights would be developed. And his argument
shows why a limitation on the community's commitment to utilitarian
maximization is required.
III
In the first section I attempted to show that some intervention to
increase equality is justified by utilitarian analysis. The result would
be to set a minimum income floor and to reduce somewhat the in-
50. See Rousseau, supra note 42, at 170. The institution of rights, I would argue,
is part of the deep structure of our practices and is clearly required by the political
and moral theory which interprets the meaning of our practices. The content of spe-
cific rights, however, is much more subject to changes in our forms of interaction and
is more likely to differ in different countries and over time. And the degree of tran-
sitoriness of specific rights varies with the right in question; cf. L. WirOENSTEIN, ON
CERTAINTY §§ 98-99, at 15 (G. Anscombe & G. von Wright eds. 1969):
98. . . . Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as
something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.
99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no al-
teration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one
place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.
51. One criticism of Dworkin's conception of rights is that by rooting them within
society, his thought seems conservatively biased. Several responses are available. First,
the critic could be asked to show the validity of using a nonhistorical, nonsocial,
Archimedian point from which to justify rights and make convincing moral argument;
cf. L. WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 50, § 110, at 17. "As if giving grounds did not come
to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an un-
grounded way of acting." Second, the criticism is misplaced. Dworkin's formulation is
dynamic; for example, fundamental social practices may require that, in order to ex-
pect people to feel obligated, society guarantee to all members that which existing
practices indicate is necessary for dignified human existence. This would be required
even if implementation of the guarantee necessitates changes in specific social arrange-
ments and recognition of previously unrecognized rights.
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comes of the richest. In the second section I described a theory of
rights or just wants, and argued that a society like the United States
must recognize some rights. I also noted that recognition of rights
would have the effect of justifying intervention that increases equality.
However, although both approaches justify intervention, taken alone12
each approach would have a different effect on total utility. The dif-
ferent effect could arise either from requiring different amounts of
redistribution or from different patterns of redistribution.53
Because of the differences in the underlying reasons for the redis-
tribution under each approach, any equivalency in the amount of
redistribution justified would be accidental. However, one could ex-
pect the amount of intervention and redistribution justified by the
two approaches to be related. Under the utilitarian analysis presented
above, the reason for setting a minimum income was that satisfaction
of certain needs up to a certain level was important enough to people
that they valued the first sum of money they received more highly
than additional equivalent sums. In fact, it is quite likely that the
basis of this valuation scheme-the reason why marginal utility of
wealth declines-lies in people's perception that the first sums of
money will allow them to fulfill their minimum needs, e.g., for
medical care, food, and education.54 In any case, our earlier assump-
tions about utility functions suggest that a richer society would re-
quire a higher minimum income. In the Dworkin approach, the
amount of intervention was determined by the amount that would
be required to guarantee certain rights to everyone. Specific rights
exist because social practices in that society indicate that a person
must have these rights as a consequence of being a full -and equal
member of that community. As practices become more complex and
involve people in greater and greater uses of wealth, that which will
be necessary to be a full member will increase. In fact, aversion to
certain consequences, the basis for the assumption of declining mar-
52. I will consider the two approaches alone rather than in combination in order
to avoid confusion. The two are not inconsistent, and I would argue that both ap-
proaches could be simultaneously adopted and applied. Dworkin argues that the
legislature should promote utility except that it must guarantee rights. See Dworkin,
supra note 5, at 176-77.
53. A different utility effect might result from the differences in reasons for the
redistributions; cf. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PuB. AFFAIRS
65, 87 n.54, 88-89 (1972); Dworkin, supra note 5, at 186 n.l.
54. Although this statement is generally true, it is not an attempt at psychological
generalization. What people need is not always what they desire. Identification of
basic needs is based on two kinds of facts: That the ftlfillment of these needs in
the given society 1) is generally thought desirable and 2) is generally viewed as pro.
viding necessary, though not sufficient, means for achieving the various goals of a
person's life-e.g., happiness, success, glory. Given this method of identification, a close
connection will exist between "basic needs" or "just wants" and what people in that
society actually desire; cf. Michelman, supra note 3, at 30.
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ginal utility of wealth, is the subjective reflection of the argument
based on social practices that certain rights must be respected if
people are treated as full members of the community and can be
expected to be obligated by the laws.
By assuming that the same amount would be redistributed under
either approach, the utility effects of the different patterns of redis-
tribution can be best observed. The utilitarian approach suggested
setting a minimum income floor rather than giving the money avail-
able for redistribution to the specific individuals with the highest
actual marginal utility for wealth. 55 The minimum need fulfillment
or rights approach does not require a specific minimum income. If
a person has a right to medical care, free speech, education, or food,
the claim is to have the "need" fulfilled up to a certain level. If a
right to medical care exists, the sick person would have a claim to
have more money spent on his medical needs than would the well
person. Providing everyone a certain minimum amount would be
irrelevant-the claimed right is to have enough goods or services to
meet the need."0
The difference between the guaranteed minimum income approach
and the minimum need fulfillment approach is obvious. If two in-
dividuals who have the same income are unable to satisfy a certain
need, the cost of satisfying that particular need will depend upon the
individual; however, the cost of raising each of their incomes to a
minimum level is the same. The two approaches would lead to the
same pattern of redistribution only if the cost of fulfilling each per-
son's just wants was the same as the difference between his income
(before redistribution) and the minimum income guaranteed by the
utilitarian approach. 57 Given differences between people, this simply
would not happen. The amount of medical care needed to keep dif-
ferent people healthy varies; the cost of fire protection needed to
give equal security to different individuals varies if only because of
the location of their homes relative to the fire station; the costs of
permitting two different people full freedom of speech varies. The
costs of fulfilling just wants are certain to vary among people who
have the same income.
55. See note 19 supra.
56. See note 31 supra.
57. If this were the case the only difference would be that in the case of rights-
since the justification implies meeting a given need the state or the society might
logically give inalienable vouchers for "goods" in kind (e.g., food stamps, a universal
health insurance plan, the vote) rather than money. This procedure would not result
in the same receipt of real income by the beneficiaries unless all recipients' value
ranking of the fulfillment of every just want exceeded their value ranking for the
expenditure of the same money on any other good which they were unable to purchase.
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In order to compare more fully the utility effects of the two ap-
proaches, we make two simplifying assumptions: 1) that the amount
redistributed is the same under either approach; 2) that the people
who receive distributions will be the same.58 Thus, in a society of
population P, a subset of the population, S, will be below the mini-
mum income level or will have claims that their just wants need
satisfying. A given amount of money, R, available for redistribution,
will either raise S to the minimum income level or fulfill the just
wants of the members of S. To simplify further, assume that subset S
includes only two people-A with a present income of 3 and B with
a present income of 3-and that the amount being redistributed, R,
is 4. Assume A's right could be fulfilled with an expenditure of 1
and B's with an expenditure of 3. Then, under the minimum in-
come or utility approach, A and B would both have 5 after the re-
distribution. Using the rights approach, A would have 4 and B would
have 6. Using a typical utility function, for example, u = Vx, 9
the total utility among subset S would be 2 V/ using the minimum
income approach and -\/-- + NF4 using the rights approach. Since
2 \/5 > V6 + V4, the rights approach would result in less utili-
ty than the minimum income approach. 60 In fact, any use of the
amount redistributed other than to raise the minimum income re-
sults in a nonutilitarian solution. This result follows inevitably from
the form of the equations, which reflect the standard utilitarian as-
sumption that individuals on the average have the same utility for a
certain amount of wealth. Thus, as long as the patterns of redistri-
bution resulting from the two approaches differ, the rights approach,
although it increases equality, does so on a nonutilitarian basis.
Conclusion
We have seen that both a utilitarian and a rights analysis justify
market intervention by society, with the effect of increasing equality.
Both reject maximization of wealth in favor of greater equality, but
58. We make the second assumption only for purposes of simplification; in actual
practice it is quite likely that different subsets of the population would receive dis-
tributions under the two approaches. For example, a person who had above the guaran-
teed minimum income might have an unsatisfied right and require an expenditure.
This assumption, like the first, only makes it easier to see the inherently different
utility effects of the two approaches.
59. See pp. 46-48 supra.
60. This works out to be 4.47 > 4.45. This result can be shown to begeneral. The
claim is that 2VF/ > yi-T + .fi-T is always true. Since 2/.r > + N-1
can be simplified to 2  > 0, which is universally true, the highest utility would
invariably be achieved by equal distribution.
Vol. 84: 39, 1974
Utility and Rights
they justify different redistributions. They would normally justify
somewhat different amounts of redistribution, but even if the amount
of redistribution justified turned out to be the same, the patterns of
redistribution would diverge, yielding different effects on overall so-
cietal utility. Although not remaining strictly faithful to traditional
utilitarianism, we could combine the two approaches. In fact, Dworkin
has suggested that utilitarian principles ought normally to be the
guide for legislative action, but that claims correctly based upon
rights should take precedence over utilitarian considerations. The
minimum income justified by utilitarianism should be provided.01
Beyond this point, if the rights approach is accepted as a proper
limitation on the use of utilitarian precepts, the society should fulfill
just wants. Even if the rights theory is accepted by the society, the
utilitarian minimum income should still be provided because the
commands of utilitarianism are to be obeyed where a right is not
involved. 2 A society could therefore provide both a minimum income
and just wants satisfaction. The result might be that everyone is
guaranteed, let us say, at least 5 (because that would maximize societal
utilities63), but some have a right to 6 or 7 (because the rights theory
justifies fulfillment of their particularly costly just wants). Applied
together, therefore, these two approaches could provide a better solu-
tion than either approach alone.64
61. It may be assumed that the rights-based distribution will decrease total so-
cietal utility below the point of optimum distribution of resources. The rights ap-
proach recognizes this decrease but argues that the importance of protecting rights
outweighs utilitarian precepts. But even though the precepts are outweighed, they are
not rendered utterly useless. Because we have accepted the assumption of declining
individual marginal utility for wealth, some redistribution from those with a low
marginal utility to those with a high (the poor) will be justified on utilitarian
grounds even if there is a concurrent redistribution based on rights. A minimum
income of some amount will generally increase societal utility over the utility supplied
by the wealth-maximizing market distribution, even where the society concurrently make
a rights-based distribution.
62. Dworkin himself has suggested that utilitarian principles ought normally to be the
guide for legislative action, but that claims correctly based upon rights should take preced-
ence over utilitarian considerations. Dworkin, supra note 5.
63. Actually the income floor would be a little less than the 5 which utility justi-
fied without just want fulfillment. This result occurs because utility requires the last
dollars taken from the top to give the same marginal utility as the last dollars re-
distributed to raise the income floor. Since rights have already taken the "cheapest"
dollars (those giving rise to the fewest utils) from the top, the income floor would
be requiring more expensive redistribution than justified; hence it must be lowered.
64. This theory may have certain practical implications. In practice, the legislature
probably would make the utilitarian calculations that result in income floor main-
tenance, and could also make provision for just wants. The courts, which are ill
equipped to make the utilitarian calculations, but are experienced in interpreting the
meaning of our social practices and in analyzing arguments claiming the existence of,
or justifying rights (courts are more experienced in hearing moral and legal arguments
than in making empirical cost-benefit studies) could recognize and enforce rights or
just want claims.
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